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What is Local Economic Development (LED)? What would ‘pro-poor’ LED 
consist of in South Africa? Are residual anti-poor strategies still being 
pursued?  
This report examines these questions and explores the still emerging 
discipline of LED in the context of globalisation. The context is important 
because since globalization intensifi ed two decades ago there has been 
extraordinary pressure on municipalities to become more entrepreneurial. 
‘Smokestack chasing’ was the main way in which they reacted to 
globalisation pressures, to the detriment of each other. The ‘race to the 
bottom’ witnessed elected offi cials offering major concessions on taxes 
and municipal services, often at the expense of their rate base and their 
citizens’ welfare.
In particular, concern about the erosion of ‘public goods’ – whether 
local (e.g., women’s inequality soared) or global (public health epidemics) 
– has emerged in the wake of this period of intense globalisation. Many 
experts acknowledge that the prior focus on purely market-determined 
economic development, accompanied by appeals for foreign investment 
by national and local leaders, led to Local Economic Underdevelopment. 
‘Sustainable development’ is back on the agenda – and not only because 
South Africa will host the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
August 2002.
South Africa’s recent LED Policy Paper has also come to decry 
old-fashioned smokestack-chasing strategies, including “the packaging 
of subsidies, tax holidays, and free infrastructure/services oriented 
to attracting outside industry.” Instead, the Department of Provincial 
and Local Government promotes six “developmental” LED strategies: 
community-based development; linkage; human capital development; 
infrastructure and municipal services; leak-plugging in the local economy; 
and retaining and expanding local economic activity.
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The old-fashioned strategies are also still evident, however, especially in 
“Export Processing Zones” (EPZs) “Industrial Development Zones” (IDZs), 
and “Spatial Development Initiatives” (SDIs) which are characterised by 
their top-down character, extremely high costs per job created (often 
in excess of R1 million), lack of inter-relationships with downstream/
upstream industries, very little employment potential and adverse prospects 
for women workers. One reason for ongoing state support for SDIs is the 
prevalance of corporate power in decision-making; another is that the 
tough work entailed in mapping out alternative strategies has not yet been 
attempted by most municipalities. That work requires sensitivity to local 
poverty, and calculations about economic benefi ts derived by poor people 
from municipal services provision.
In addition to gender equality, improved public health, lower levels of 
racial segregation, and improved social capital, a renewed commitment 
to municipal infrastructure investment and service delivery would have 
enormous positive economic implications for job creation, worker 
productivity and small enterprise promotion. For example, for every 100 
households that are connected to the electricity grid, between 10 and 20 
new economic activities are started. 
To achieve bottom-up LED, with all its social and environmental 
benefi ts, requires an approach to municipal services provision based 
upon municipal responsibilities to provide at least a basic minimal 
amount of water/sanitation (50 litres per person per day is the medium-
target in the Reconstruction and Development Programme) and electricity 
(1 kiloWatt hour per capita per day) as a lifeline amount, with higher 
volume consumption (i.e., following the 50th liter of water) attracting much 
higher (and rising) tariffs. The fi rst step, however, is for municipalities to 
commit to pursuing LED from the bottom up, through embracing their 
own capacities, nurturing and sustaining a more genuinely developmental 
approach to their local economies, and reversing worsening patterns of 





A NEW PARADIGM FOR LED?
Local Economic Development (LED) is a discipline still coming into its own, with competing strands of argumentation still generating confl ict. At the root of the confl ict is debate over whether traditional types of local strategies, applied in Southern and 
Eastern Africa, a) are working, and b) are generating “pro-poor” economic 
development – or instead, simply more “uneven development.” The latter 
term refers to a structured, systematic mode of capital accumulation at one 
pole, and the “development of underdevelopment” at another. Although 
it was once associated with “dependency theory,” it is a far more subtle 
conceptual approach to understanding ingrained poverty and inequality 
(See Bond 1999, Bond 1998 and Bond 2000). The past two decades have, 
after all, witnessed extraordinary pressure on local authorities, especially 
formal municipalities, to become more entrepreneurial. These pressures 
have accompanied the overall slow-down in growth in the international 
economy that began during the late 1970s, and refl ect shifting power 
relations. In short, urban entrepreneurialism became a feature of virtually 
all LED strategies as competition for investment intensifi ed. The term 
“smokestack-chasing” emerged to characterise the most ambitious attempts 
to “place-market” a given municipality.
The tide has probably turned on this epoch, which was called the 
period of the “Washington Consensus” because it entailed rigid nation-
state adherence to “neoliberal” (free-market) dictates, often enforced by 
the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the discipline of 
international fi nancial markets. These include:
 • government budget cuts, increases in user-fees for public services 
  and privatisation of state enterprises;
 • the lifting of price controls, subsidies and any other distortions 
  of market forces;
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 • liberalisation of currency controls and currency devaluation;
 • higher interest rates and deregulation of local fi nance;
 • removal of import barriers (trade tariffs and quotas); and
 • an emphasis on promotion of exports, above all other economic 
  priorities.
It may only be symbolic, but the choice of Joseph Stiglitz as Nobel Prize 
co-recipient in October 2001 signifi es a potential break from the old 
mode of economic policy-making, one which will soon reach municipal 
levels. Stiglitz’ prize-winning work on “information-theoretic” economics 
allowed him to establish a very strong moral commitment to “sustainable 
development” during his 1997-99 tenure as chief economist at the World 
Bank, and his infl uence is one reason why in 1998-99, the Bank and 
IMF turned to Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes. Although many 
observers – e.g., in the Jubilee movement across Africa and the Third World 
– have decried the strong rhetoric while little has changed in real terms, this 
may also be a matter of time. For Stiglitz’ two most important refutations of 
the Washington Consensus only occurred in 1998, at the United Nations 
University’s World Institute for Development Economic Research (Stiglitz 
1998a), and at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(Stiglitz 1998b),
Subsequently, renewed attention to “global public goods” by many 
in the United Nations system, including the World Bank, suggests that 
the prior focus on purely market-determined economic development, 
accompanied by appeals for foreign investment by national and local 
leaders, may truly be nearing an end. It is now obvious to all concerned 
that the striking inequalities generated in recent decades must be reversed, 
otherwise risks of social, economic, political, cultural, religious and 
environmental stress will become unbearable. In the sphere of LED, this 
means that something other than the “smokestack-chasing” of investment-
attraction, entrepreneurial modes will be required – in part because the 
strategy of attracting foreign investment simply isn’t working in Africa.
THE DECLINE OF “SMOKESTACK-CHASING”
There are many African leaders – both in states and civil societies – who have voiced a commitment to a Stiglitz-style “Post-Washington Consensus” that focuses more on sustainable local development than on the failed structural adjustment strategies. To take one 
example, even South African president Thabo Mbeki has recognised that:
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Many of our countries, including all those on our Continent, do not 
have and are unlikely to have in the foreseeable future, the strength 
themselves to determine on their own what should happen to their 
economies. The more they get integrated into the world economy, the 
further will this capacity be reduced, making them more dependent on 
the rest of the world economy with regard to meeting the challenge of 
ending poverty within their countries (Mbeki 2000a).
The evidence for this, Mbeki continues, lies in the failure of foreign 
investors to materialise in suffi cient quantity to allow capital accumulation 
to “take off” in Africa:
Notwithstanding some specifi c problems in some developing countries 
and especially African countries, there are many among these countries 
that have and continue to have stability and are at peace with 
themselves, countries that have responded positively, even under very 
diffi cult circumstances, to the prescriptions of both the prospective 
investors as well as the multi-lateral institutions. Many of these 
countries have created the necessary climate conducive to investment, 
for example by liberalising their trade, privatising state-owned 
enterprises, reforming their tax system and generally adhering to the 
prescribed injunctions, all done in an attempt to attract the necessary 
investments. The response from the developed countries, to these 
attempts by especially many African countries to stay within the 
confi nes of the rules, has been to treat the African continent as one 
country, and therefore, to punish a country on the one end of the 
continent for the deeds of another on the other end. In our own country, 
we have been assured that our economic fundamentals are correct 
and sound. We have developed a stable and effective fi nancial and 
fi scal system. We have reduced tariffs to levels that are comparable 
to the advanced industrial countries. We have reformed agriculture to 
make it the least subsidised of all the major agricultural trading nations. 
We have restructured our public sector through privatisation, strategic 
partners and regulation. We have an equitable and sophisticated 
system of labour relations that is continually adjusting to new 
developments. We play an active role in all multilateral agencies in 
the world. Yet, the fl ow of investment into South Africa has not met 
our expectations while the levels of poverty and unemployment remain 
high (Mbeki 2000b).
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To review the data on investment fl ows to Africa as a whole – and 
Eastern/Southern Africa in particular – is depressing. Across the world 
there was a large upsurge in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) since the 
1980s (United Nations 2000). From levels in the $50-100 billion range 
from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s (as profi ts stagnated at post-war 
lows in the major industrialised countries), there was a huge boom once 
liberalisation of fi nancial and trade policies were imposed, and as local 
currencies fell dramatically in the process. Overseas investments by TNCs 
skyrocketed to $865 billion by 1999, getting fi resale prices in East Asia 
at the end of the century thanks to that region’s fi nancial collapse. From 
1990-99, global FDI rose by 314%, compared to an increase in world 
trade of 65% and world GDP growth of 40%. However, FDI trends 
exemplifi ed global “uneven development.” Just ten major developed 
countries account for 70% of FDI activity (Japan, Belgium/Luxembourg, 
Ireland, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Sweden, Britain and 
the United States). Still, a growing share of FDI can be found in the 
largest emerging markets (especially China, East Asia and the large Latin 
American countries). All developing countries attracted annual FDI fl ows 
of $175 billion during 1997-98 and $200 billion in 1999 (up from just $25 
billion in 1990). During the 1990s, annual commercial bank loans rose 
from $20 billion to $100 billion in 1997 but dropped back down to 
$20 billion in 1999; portfolio investment rose from $5 billion to $50 
billion in 1996 but fell to $25 billion in 1999; and Offi cial Development 
Assistance stayed relatively stagnant at around $50 billion over the period. 
Thus by 1999, FDI represented 67% of all North-South fl ows of resources. 
Meanwhile, Africa’s share of FDI fell from 25% of all TNC investments 
during the 1970s to less than 5% during the late 1990s. And even the tiny 
amounts of FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years can be attributed 
in large part to oil company investments in Angola ($1.8 billion in 1999) 
and Nigeria ($1.4 billion).
The only substantive FDI fl ows into Sub-Saharan Africa unrelated to 
extractive minerals by 1999 were into South Africa ($1.4 billion). But 
on a relative basis, that amounted to just $10 per $1000 of GDP in 
South Africa (the same as Zimbabwe). And regrettably, due to liberalised 
foreign exchange controls, South Africa’s own outfl ows of FDI (by 
SA-headquartered fi rms) exceeded infl ows, even before the repatriation of 
dividends/profi ts, payments of patent/royalty fees. Worse, statistics have 
never picked up the durable problem of transfer pricing, whereby foreign 
investors steal money from developing countries by misinvoicing inputs 
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drawn from abroad (e.g., mining fi rms in South Africa through their Zug, 
Switzerland offi ces). In any event, the bulk of FDI into South Africa was 
based on mergers and acquisitions. Many thousands of jobs were lost in 
the process, and inappropriate technology transfer made South Africa all 
the more dependent and vulnerable. In all these regards, FDI exacerbated 
South Africa’s and Africa’s vulnerabilities. 
The importance for African municipalities of the FDI drought is evident 
once we consider the range of LED interventions that have been attempted 
in recent decades. South Africa’s own LED Policy Paper came to decry 
the old-fashioned smokestack-chasing strategies, including “the packaging 
of subsidies, tax holidays, and free infrastructure/services oriented to 
attracting outside industry. Increasingly, due to the self-defeating nature 
of ‘race-to-the-bottom’ competition, a new approach to LED has emerged 
that instead highlights the mobilisation of internal resources, capacities and 
skills” (Republic of South Africa 2001).
SOUTH AFRICA’S MANDATES FOR A DIFFERENT LED
That South African policy document, entitled Refocusing Development on the Poor, recalls most prominently the developmental and pro-poor responsibilities that municipalities have in South Africa. The most important of these are cited 
in Refocusing Development, and include the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme LED mandate which emerged in the African 
National Congress campaign platform during the fi rst democratic election 
in South African history:
s.4.3.5 In order to foster the growth of local economies, broadly 
representative institutions must be established to address local 
economic development needs. Their purpose would be to formulate 
strategies to address job creation and community development (for 
example, leveraging private sector funds for community development, 
investment strategies, training, small business and agricultural 
development, etc.). If necessary, the democratic government must 
provide some subsidies as a catalyst for job-creation programmes 
controlled by communities and/or workers, and target appropriate job 
creation and development programmes in the most neglected and 
impoverished areas of our country. Ultimately, all such projects should 
sustain themselves.
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Two years later, in 1996, the Constitution established the following “socio-
economic rights” that municipalities must observe:
s.24(1) Everyone has the right a) to an environment that is not 
harmful to their health or well-being; and b) to have the environment 
protected... s.26(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate 
housing... s.27(1) Everyone has the right to have access to a) health 
care services, including reproductive health care; b) suffi cient food and 
water; and c) social security, including, if they are unable to support 
themselves and their dependents, appropriate social assistance.
The meaning of these rights are still being established in case law, 
including the September 2000 “Grootboom Decision” which deemed 
both national and municipal policies unconstitutional because neither 
the Department of Housing in Pretoria nor the Western Cape province’s 
Westdene municipality offered even short-term emergency housing and 
municipal services to the poorest of the poor.
Finally, an additional progressive mandate emerged in a 1998 Local 
Government White Paper, which – as noted in Refocusing Development – 
endorses basic service subsidies, support to community organisations (in 
the form of fi nances, technical skills or training), and “linkage” policies that 
directly couple profi table growth and investment with redistribution and 
community development in lower-income sections of a municipality.
OUT WITH ORTHODOX LED
As discussed in more detail below, practical contestation between “place-marketing” and “pro-poor” visions of LED continues – and in some municipalities has reached crisis point – but the overall trend should be clear. To conceptualise this within the context 
of international trends, consider the following diverse approaches to LED. 
As understood in South African debates that have raged since the mid-
1990s, traditional approaches assert that the key to prosperity is attracting 
(primarily manufacturing) investment through concessions such as tax 
breaks, cheap land, reduced rates, and even direct fi nancial rewards 
in return for locating in the area. The argument is that investment 
creates jobs and provides taxes, which can be used for service provision. 
The various subcomponents of the old, orthodox paradigm of LED 
include strategies termed entrepreneurial-competitive, urban effi ciency and 
progressive-competitive. Brief descriptions of the typologies may be useful.
9
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“Entrepreneurial-competitive” strategies emphasise the importance of local 
comparative advantages and small businesses in job creation. Local 
authorities play a pro-active role in identifying actual or potential growth 
sectors and in directly supporting local businesses through research, 
loans, grants, consultancy, premises, technical infrastructure and so 
on. Municipalities have engaged in research to identify the particular 
economic strengths of their locality, and some have even produced a local 
industrial strategy.
“Urban effi ciency” proponents argue that local authorities should raise 
urban productivity, in part by lowering the costs of living and doing 
business in the locality. Some have argued that this is best achieved by 
minimising government intervention, especially by cutting taxes and service 
charges, and by privatising services where possible. By contrast, others 
believe that strong government planning is key to achieving effi ciency.
Amongst “progressive-competitive” strategies, Human Resource 
Development is also identifi ed as a key focus for local economic 
development strategies. The argument is that low skill levels, especially 
amongst the poor, are a key constraint facing potential investors. 
Furthermore, poor people are unlikely to benefi t from whatever new jobs 
there are unless they have appropriate skills. Local authorities can either 
support the establishment of local training bodies or focus the activities of 
national training agencies in the local area. In addition, conditions can be 
imposed on companies doing business with the municipality, requiring that 
fi rms provide a minimum amount of training for their employees.
IN WITH “DEVELOPMENTAL” LED
In contrast, “community-based” strategies associated with a new, more sustainable LED paradigm, emphasise the importance of working directly with low-income communities and their organisations. Investment is all very well, but the benefi ts are unlikely to accrue to 
the most needy unless they are active participants in new development, 
with the capacity to plan, monitor and enforce wider benefi ts. Support 
for institutions such as community development trusts and worker- 
or community-controlled enterprises such as local credit unions or 
development corporations is a key feature of this approach. This approach 
explicitly aims to link profi table growth and redistributive development.
After extensive international study, the South African government 
categorised six “developmental” LED strategies which it made a 
commitment to supporting: community-based development; linkage; 
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human capital development; infrastructure and municipal services; leak-
plugging in the local economy; and retaining and expanding local 
economic activity:
 •  Community economic development refers to municipal 
  assistance aimed at the grassroots. Benefi ciaries will range from 
  community businesses and cooperatives, to “local exchange 
  and trading systems” (LETS), to “third sector” development 
  experiments (e.g., People’s Housing Processes), savings collectives 
  and informal lending arrangements, community-based environ-
  mental management and maintenance schemes, urban farming 
  projects, etc. Such community-based strategies emphasise the 
  importance of working directly with low-income communities 
  and their organizations;
 •  A related approach is to explicitly aim to link profi table 
  growth to redistributive development/fi nancing. An example is 
  construction linkage (also known as “planning gain”), whereby 
  planning or zoning permission in profi table geographical areas is 
  linked to a commitment to invest (for affordable housing, 
  for instance) in impoverished neighbourhoods. Another example 
  of a progressive approach is a requirement that banks or other 
  fi nancial institutions opening a branch in a wealthier area must 
  also do so in a low-income neighbourhood, and must also invest a 
  certain proportion of their turnover in local small businesses;
 •  Ensuring that economic development brings social benefi ts 
  often requires explicit linkages between “living wages,” human 
  capital development and productivity. Hence, over the past few 
  years, several major municipalities in the United States have 
  introduced living wage ordnances (legislation) at local level, to 
  mitigate against the very low pay that results from certain kinds of 
  employment growth – in services, especially – and to ensure 
  that outside investors are circulating more resources within the 
  local community;
 •  Development and maintenance of infrastructure and services is 
  another vital component. If done properly, developmental LED 
  results from the provision of reliable, cost-effective municipal 
  service delivery (lifeline supplies of water, electricity, sanitation, 
  roads, etc);
11
Local Economic Development Debates in South Africa
 •  The above interventions should also have the effect of plugging 
  the leaks in the local economy, through using resources that 
  are close at hand. Sometimes it becomes crucial to stem the 
  outfl ow of money from poor areas by encouraging people to 
  buy local, supporting and building periodic markets, funding 
  special events and festivals, providing infrastructure using local 
  labour and locally-manufactured material, promoting employee 
  training, and networking enterprises of all sizes in the local area, 
  etc.;
 •  Finally, without fi rm local rootedness, economic activity cannot 
  usually be parachuted down from above. Hence, retention and 
  expansion of existing businesses is a common approach. 
  Objectives are typically to assist local businesses to improve their 
  productivity, increase market share and graduate to higher value-
  added levels in the production chain (Republic of South Africa 
  2001).
But are these policy-based strategies being applied in practice? 
Unfortunately, in some South African municipalities and in some pockets 
of national government, there remains a residual attraction to place-
marketing, smokestack-chasing and urban-entrepreneurial approaches – 
whether via traditional “Export Processing Zones” (EPZs) or “Industrial 
Development Zones” (IDZs), or the more recent “Spatial Development 
Initiative” (SDI) strategy. In part, the ongoing reliance upon orthodox 
LED refl ects corporate-dominated power relations, but in part it also 
refl ects the failure of some municipal offi cials to give more attention to 
sustainable development, especially the broader “externalities” associated 
with municipal services. Crucial contrasts in the two types of practical 
strategies are considered next.
RESIDUAL ORTHODOXY: SDI/IDZS AND THE CASE OF 
COEGA1
Critics of orthodox LED strategies have recognised that they entail a “race 
to the bottom” with all other municipalities. The new South African policy 
discourages LED in the form of:
mere lobbying for government development projects and funding 
programmes, hosting of special events, providing (often unaffordable) 
tax and fi nancial incentives, and skewing social objectives when 
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investors make unreasonable demands upon municipal government. In 
South Africa, this strategy has been given too much weight, dating even 
to the 19th century when the major port cities were vying with one 
another for investment (Republic of South Africa 2001). 
One of the main controversies that has dogged South African LED concerns 
the country’s single largest proposed economic development project, at the 
Coega River mouth just north of Port Elizabeth, which is being motivated 
as an IDZ. Reasons why the Coega strategy may not be developmental, or 
even work on its own terms, are worth reviewing, because they also relate 
to broader international trends. The Coega project hinges on the promise 
that SDIs – and within these, IDZs – will help South Africa overcome 
its lack of international competitiveness.2  The diffi culty of overcoming 
this problem, inherited from apartheid, is refl ected in the massive glut in 
unutilised international production capacity (worse by 1999 than at any 
other time since the 1930s, and far worse in late 2001) (The Economist, 
22 February 1999). 
The South African Department of Trade and Industry’s project 
methodology seeks fi rst to identify potential port/rail/IDZ complexes in 
an underdeveloped target area that might be of interest to investors, and 
then help local stakeholders plan and promote infrastructural investments 
which improve access. According to government, the main aims of SDIs 
for South Africa are:
 • to promote export orientation amongst South African fi rms;
 • to earn foreign exchange;
 • to ensure sustainable job creation;
 • to ensure better utilisation of infrastructure and resources; and
 • to broaden the ownership base of the economy (Jourdan, P., K. 
  Gordhan, D. Arkwright, and G. de Beer 1996).
SDIs are to be managed and operated jointly by the state and the private 
sector and are sometimes designed to include a major road development. 
Some of the SDIs also link to ports in neighbouring countries such as 
Namibia and Mozambique. Coega fi ts into the envisaged “Fish River SDI” 
that would stretch along the Indian Ocean to East London. The SDIs – 
especially “development corridors” – were formulated in 1995 by the 
Departments of Transport and Trade and Industry (DTI), which aimed 
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to reduce growth discrepancies between the regions of South Africa, as 
part of a process of economic re-balancing. However, the theory behind 
the SDI strategy has been criticised for being spatially-determinist (as if 
merely a corridor locational arrangement will solve durable problems of 
underdevelopment and uneven development), environmentally destructive, 
extraordinarily capital-intensive, and inappropriate for backward-forward 
linkages and for empowerment of previously oppressed people (Pape et al 
2001; Jauch and Keet 1996).
There is also a regional (Southern African) rationale for SDIs, of 
which 14 mostly cross-border projects are proposed. The DTI website 
argues that a bigger and more integrated market will be more attractive 
to foreign investors, will help SADC countries achieve “self-suffi ciency, 
industrialisation and modernisation of their economies” and will 
“increase SADC countries’ bargaining power in international markets.” 
These are important objectives, but are irrelevant in the case of Coega, 
given the project’s distance and lack of direct relationship to any cross-
border corridor.
SDIs have received high-level political support and in each SDI area 
high expectations have been built up within local communities. According 
to a study conducted in August 2000 by the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC) for the DTI, of 1 216 SDI projects identifi ed, 338 
are in the implementation stage and 77 have been completed. Another 
531 were at the concept/pre-feasibility stage, 213 at the feasibility stage, 
40 approved and 17 dropped. The vast majority of projects under 
implementation in August 2000 were in the Fish River area (109), followed 
by the Maputo Corridor (60) and the Lebombo SDI (37). Some projects on 
the IDC list existed before the SDI was set up, in the form of late-apartheid 
“megaprojects,” so are not technically SDI investments. Columbus Steel, 
Namakwa Sands and Highveld Steel and Vanadium are mainly owned by 
Anglo American Corporation, Alusaf by Gencor, and Saldanha Steel by 
Iscor (which is mainly owned by Gencor and Anglo American). Mozal is 
mainly owned by Billiton, a London-listed subsidiary of Gencor. All have a 
large share investment by the Industrial Development Corporation. Critics 
of these projects at the time argued that the cost per job created was 
extremely high (R1-3 million), with no guarantee of supplying downstream 
industries with employment potential.  Some created far fewer jobs than 
were originally planned. 
It is also diffi cult to tell whether a new project set up because the 
SDI was there or whether it would have set up anyway. And some 
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projects – such as the arms-purchase offset at Coega3 and proposed 
Ramatex textile factory in East London4 – simply failed to materialise. Thus, 
notwithstanding a few successes, the SDI programme has only attracted a 
very small percentage of the investment that was hoped for.
For example, the West Coast Investment Initiative identifi ed 120 
projects, but so far only 17 have gone ahead and most of these have 
been government supported. The private sector has appeared reluctant 
to take up the opportunities on offer. This is a general problem. There 
have been a number of other smaller projects in areas such as agriculture 
and tourism, but often the hoped-for private investment has not come 
through and government has had to pick up the bill. For example the Bird 
Island tourism project in Lambert’s Bay, Western Cape tried to get private 
companies to fi nance the setting up of a restaurant and curio shop to help 
boost tourism to the area. When this failed, the Western Cape Provincial 
Government had to rescue the project. Likewise, the Lubombo SDI had a 
second investor conference in November 2000 because so few investments 
were forthcoming from the fi rst.
Moreover, a major concern with existing SDIs is that backward-forward 
linkages are either not happening, or are inappropriate. Given their 
orientation towards export promotion, most IDZs will not build in domestic 
forward linkages through supplying South African fi rms, and therefore no 
jobs will be created in this way. In the case of IDZs that involve steel 
companies, as was proposed for Coega by Ferrostaal, another problem is 
downstream pricing. Saldanha Steel charges export parity prices for foreign 
customers (and has been accused of “dumping” by the US government for 
doing so, resulting in restricted US imports), and import parity prices for 
South Africans (and the import prices are much higher than export prices). 
This additional cost does not encourage domestic companies to embark 
on job creation.
How successful has the SDI/IDZ strategy been to date in creating jobs? 
According to West Coast labour leader Simon Arries (regional organiser 
for the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa), “The community 
perception was that the Saldanha project will be for their benefi t, but so 
far they have only had the crumbs from the table.” Given that SDI projects 
are very capital-intensive, claims for sustainable new jobs appear highly 
exaggerated. For instance, Saldanha Steel only employs 700 people and 
Mozal only 400, whereas Columbus Steel was constructed over the shell of 
Middleburg Steel without creating a single new permanent job. 
Overall, there is no doubt that the SDI programme has created some 
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jobs. But in many cases the jobs have been exceptionally expensive given 
the capital-intensive nature of SDI-related production, and moreover the 
number of net jobs may be even smaller given that existing jobs may be 
phased out (for example, Saldanha led to job losses at the Vanderbijlpark 
steel plant in Gauteng). The more incentives that are used to try to 
attract investment, the more companies will relocate mainly to chase the 
incentives, thus replacing unemployment in one area with that in another.
Sometimes SDIs have only created temporary jobs; for example, during 
the construction of the N4 toll road 2000 people were employed. (A 
similar number are expected to be employed in construction work at 
Coega.) But when the short-term jobs are fi nished, additional problems 
emerge. Many people moved to Saldanha to work on the construction 
of the Steel Mill, but when that was fi nished, they stayed, contributing 
to unemployment in the area. New squatter camps have been built and 
an extra burden was placed on local resources. The type of jobs created 
in SDIs are also not optimal. Although companies promise to employ 
local people (and this is sometimes required if they are to benefi t from 
government subsidies), often they are only offered the lowest paid and 
lowest skilled jobs. The skilled and managerial positions still go to people 
from outside the area, sometimes even from outside the country. In the 
case of Saldanha, the contract to manage the construction of the mill went 
to a national company that had been involved in the Richard’s Bay project. 
They brought in many of their own workers.
There are also heated debates over the extent to which genuine, 
sustainable skills upgrading occurs in SDIs. Skills upgrading often occurs 
because there are few skilled workers in the local community. Companies 
have promised to train local staff so in the future they will be qualifi ed 
for the more highly skilled jobs. But trade union offi cials have questioned 
how seriously companies take their promises. For example one company 
on the West Coast (Duferco) does have a training programme for staff, but 
this concentrates on basic issues like health and safety for people operating 
machinery. It doesn’t help workers gain the transferable skills they need 
for the future.
EPZs in other parts of the world, particularly in low-income countries, 
share some common features. Typically:
 • they are enclosed areas, often fenced off and protected;
 • they are set aside for the production of goods for export, so are 
  often located at a port or near an airport;
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 • they particularly aim to attract foreign investors;
 • they have a special customs status, so goods coming in or going 
  out do not have to pay customs duties;
 • they offer companies special incentives to invest, such as tax 
  holidays, cheap loans or discounted water or electricity; and
 • some EPZs include exceptions to normal labour legislation, 
  environmental standards or lower wages.
In many international settings, such zones have performed poorly. 
Technology and skills transfers have been practically non-existent, with 
managerial and technical jobs mainly going to foreign nationals. Given 
that the import content of EPZ fi rms tends to be 60% or greater, foreign 
exchange earnings are often overstated as an advantage of EPZs. The 
main backward linkages tend to be packaging and simple engineering 
inputs. Diversifi cation is diffi cult. And fi nancial liabilities by governments 
to EPZ fi rms are often extremely high due to excessive bidding 
between competitive EPZ locations. Recent thinking about IDZs 
has changed dramatically as a result of the experience with such 
installations, particularly in the OECD countries. The large-scale 
traditional heavy industry-based approach generated slower growth 
and pollution externalities that hampered rather than helped promote 
competitiveness. The old, capital-intensive IDZ centred on a major 
industrial facility is being replaced by a more fl exible, small-scale 
approach based on clusters that take advantage of the synergies created 
by investment in common sourcing, especially for skill-intensive processes 
that have major environmental implications.
Specifi c emphasis has been focused on research to ensure that there are 
complementarities in the use of local resources (backward linkages) and 
on the transformation of waste streams of one sector into productive 
inputs for another. Throughout the OECD countries it has been observed 
that the traditional manufacturing centres and development zones, most 
especially around transportation hubs, had become “brownfi elds,” i.e., 
sites where chemical and other forms of toxicity were now requiring 
substantial investments to minimise the damages from the past. Because 
there appear to be important diseconomies of scale with regard to 
contamination, new IDZs will have to invest heavily in the infrastructure 
for environmental protection and remediation. This is no longer simply a 
matter of compliance with national standards, regulations or safeguards, 
but rather a matter of survival, since fi rms that are competing 
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in global markets fi nd that working up to international managerial 
and environmental standards (ISO 9000 and 14000) are increasingly 
prerequisites for successful market penetration and qualifi cation in 
competitions for international contract tenders. 
It is increasingly evident that advances in technology and relative 
prices have changed the importance of proximity in developing advantages 
and in evaluating complementarities. The standardized calculations of 
competitiveness no longer can simply be determined on the basis of 
reducing the most obvious direct costs of production and distribution. The 
dynamic ability to maintain and increase productivity and to incorporate 
technological advances in all phases of the production process from 
design to fi nal sale requires more diversifi ed productive structures and 
a more balanced capability to supply high-level human resources and 
services than an orthodox-IDZ typically provides. The alternative to 
maintaining production processes and human resources at the cutting edge 
of technology is to move into more direct competition with Third World 
EPZs. But such a strategy poses troublesome challenges.
Across the Third World, competition between municipalities engaged in 
EPZ-type LED has been fi erce, as cities often bid against each other to 
provide fi nancial concessions, opportunities for environmental degradation, 
labour law deregulation, and the exploitation of unorganised women, in 
particular. Tables 1 and 2  –  prepared by regional labour organizations  
–  provide a partial late-1990s glance at the nature of Third World 
EPZs. Enormous tax breaks, forgiveness of customs duties, government 
infrastructure and other concessions have been provided. Sometimes 
complete relaxation of labour law is common in some competing EPZs. 
In many cases, trade union organising has been brutally repressed, or sub-
minimum (and sub-poverty) wages were imposed (Jean-Paul and Szymanski 
1996). During the mid-1990s, one labour study estimated that one-third 
of all jobs in 230 EPZs in 70 Third World countries paid less than the 
host country’s minimum wage (International Congress of Free Trade Unions 
1995).  Invariably, women are most adversely affected by the declining 
standards. According to the International Labour Organization, “EPZ jobs 
are primarily unskilled jobs in highly labour intensive industries, occupied 
for the most part by young women who are entering the salaried labour 
force for the fi rst time, and who tend to leave their EPZ job a few years later 
when they get married”(cited in Southern African Trade Union Coordinating 
Council 1996: 12). The predominance of young, unmarried women in EPZs 
is based on several cause-and-effect refl ections of their vulnerability:
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 • women constitute a cheaper labour force due to existing wage 
  differentials;
 • women are perceived as more docile than men and more willing 
  to accept tough conditions, monotonous and repetitive work;
 • women are perceived to possess nimble fi ngers which enhance 
  their manual dexterity and adaptability to the textiles and 
  electronics sectors that are predominant in EPZs;
 • women’s involvement in trade unions is minimal and traditional 
  ways of recruiting membership have not been effective partly due 
  to the male dominance of trade union leadership which results in 
  the neglect of issues that affect women; and
 • women are perceived as secondary wage earners, and are hence 
  easily disposable, given the fl exibility required in a strategy so 
  susceptible to frequent demand shifts (Nababsing 1997).
The international lessons of EPZs noted above are particularly important 
in Eastern and Southern Africa, given that these regions do not fare well 
in competition with developed countries’ higher-tech (and hence higher-
productivity) EPZs. Because of these kinds of problems, South Africa 
appears to be downgrading its SDI strategy. According to the director of the 
West Coast SDI in an interview in 2001: “Whereas it was indeed agreed 
all along that the SDI programme was a short, sharp initiative which would 
have to be integrated into existing institutions, the high expectations of 
senior politicians and their electorate were not met over the past three 
years in most SDIs and the programme has been downgraded.” 
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International Labour Resource and Information Group, Centre for Southern 
African Studies, and Labour Law Unit, University of Cape Town, Cape Town; 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (1999), “Industrial Relations and Sustainable 
Development in Export Processing Zones,” Harare.
Table 2: The Application of Labour Laws in EPZs
Sources: Southern African Trade Union Coordinating Council (1996), “Export 
Processing Zones in Southern Africa: Social, Political and Economic Implications,” 
International Labour Resource and Information Group, Centre for Southern 
African Studies, and Labour Law Unit, University of Cape Town, Cape Town; 
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Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (1999), “Industrial Relations and Sustainable 
Development in Export Processing Zones,” Harare.
The main problem with Coega is the lack of proven economic viability 
associated with the project. As a result, a revolt is underway by many 
important voices in society, including the mass media. Environmental 
and community groups in the Nelson Mandela Metropole Sustainability 
Coalition have consistently opposed Coega (http://www.coega.org). 
Business Day newspaper has regularly editorialised against it, as have other 
newspapers in the Eastern Cape province in which Port Elizabeth is located. 
Taxpayers are concerned, given reports of corruption associated with the 
R66 billion arms-sale agreement that link Coega to political insiders. The 
impoverished provincial and municipal governments have spent millions 
on research and development, including feasibility studies and market 
research (much of which has not been available to the public); purchase 
of 12 000 hectares of land; and budget allocations for building water, 
road and rail infrastructure suitable to accommodate a container facility 
and metalurgical heavy industry complex. Anticipated spending of R850 
million in IDZ-related construction will occur through 2005. Tax holidays 
of six years, import/export duty exemptions, and large subsidies on water 
and electricity inputs have been offered to potential investors.
In contrast, it is useful to return to LED debates concerning the 
merits of basic human-need municipal services as economic inputs and 
as a means of saving on other eco-social externalities. The debate over 
public infrastructure investment subsidies in the Mandela Metropole may 
ultimately only be settled in relation to the key economic variables, growth 
and job creation. It is therefore important to show that the most direct 
way of enhancing local economic development in Port Elizabeth, and in 
most locales, is through employment that allows households to survive, 
reproduce and save for future consumption or investment. Such a people-
centred approach would serve as the logical alternative to the corporate-
driven, top-down Coega project as it currently stands.
AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY: MUNICIPAL COMMUNITY 
SERVICES-BASED LED 
The South African Department of Provincial and Local Government commissioned a report in 1998 to investigate the possibility of a “bottom-up” approach to Local Economic Development in Port Elizabeth and across the Eastern Cape. There are many other aspects 
of the human and social condition that are promoted by access to 
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infrastructure and municipal services, including greater gender equality, 
improved public health, lower levels of racial segregation, and improved 
social capital. In short, an economic case can be made for greater 
investment in basic infrastructure (details of the background research 
summarised in this section can be found in Bond, Cities of Gold, 
Townships of Coal, Parts II and III).
After considering the impact of infrastructure investment and service 
delivery upon job creation, the related issues of worker productivity 
and small enterprise creation can be examined. However, the pricing 
of infrastructure and services is just as crucial, particularly the need for 
properly-designed subsidies and cross-subsidies (as an alternative to the 
existing policy). In addition, there is a growing awareness of the need 
for demand-side management of municipal resources (especially water). 
But the progress envisaged in these areas is potentially threatened by the 
growing momentum towards privatisation of municipal services.
Aside from there being a rationale, through municipal services 
provision, for a “bottom-up” approach to LED, there are many other 
aspects of the human and social condition that are promoted by access 
to basic infrastructure, including greater gender equality, improved public 
health, lower levels of racial segregation, and improved social capital. 
However, it is primarily the economic case that is made for the purposes 
of this paper. 
Infrastructure-related employment is largely in the fi eld of construction. 
Formal sector construction employment includes residential (high- and 
low-income groups), non-residential (commercial, industrial and civic 
amenities) as well as civil engineering construction (for infrastructure, bulk 
infrastructure and earth works). Employment based upon infrastructure 
development was often anticipated to be the main engine of job 
creation in post-apartheid South Africa. For example, in 1993, formal 
sector employment generated by low-cost housing construction alone was 
estimated by National Housing Forum consultants as increasing from 233 
000 in 1992 to 400 000 in 2010, and related informal sector employment 
from 984 000 to 1.7 million. The Green Paper on Public Works noted 
that with respect to job creation, “Some estimates are that 3-3.5 million 
people could benefi t from public works programmes in South Africa today 
(depending on the state of the economy, the number participating at any 
one time would probably be 1-2.5 million).” Thus far such expectations 
have failed to materialise. Yet infrastructure and housing continue to be 
key Reconstruction and Development Programme policy priorities, and 
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construction work more generally remains an extremely important part of 
the labour market, as well as in relation to fi xed capital investment.
It is not only the quantity and remuneration of jobs that is important, 
but increasingly the quality of employment and the depth of skills that 
employees bring to their work. There are several means of considering 
economic benefi ts that fl ow from enhanced literacy and productivity 
of citizens. Electrifi cation reduces reproductive rates through altering 
social relationships and generating economic opportunities, and as a 
result, women in electrifi ed areas place more emphasis on children’s 
education than on children as productive agents. Electrifi cation provides 
some of the essential prerequisites for education, such as lighting and 
opportunities for effi cient administration. In addition it generates the 
potential for longer school days, opening of night schools and access to 
audio-visual aids. It enables children and adults to study at home and 
offers the opportunity for health promotion through the broadcast media 
such as television and radio.
The use of electricity in a household can have several effects on 
the productivity of inhabitants. Firstly, improved lighting brings about 
considerable improvements to the quality of the working environment 
of students and scholars. The ability to study at home, although also 
dependent on other factors such as the number of people in the household 
and the number of rooms available, is certainly enhanced through 
electrifi cation. Education has been shown to impact directly on a range of 
variables which, taken together, contribute to the health status of domestic 
units and ultimately of the nation. There is a high rate of social return 
through investment in education and this rate of return is substantially 
higher for women than men. Female education has an impact upon 
reproductive rates, child-rearing practices and child-mortality rates. Higher 
levels of maternal education have a signifi cant impact on nutrition of 
children, improved child health and reduction in diarrhea morbidity.
Improved lighting and air quality can also increase the quality of 
life of inhabitants, and this has a positive effect on their productivity in 
places of employment or income generation. Finally, good health results 
in fewer days lost to illness, increased productivity, greater opportunities to 
obtain better paying jobs and longer working lives. Healthier workers earn 
more because they are more productive and can get better paying jobs. 
Environmentally caused diseases have been shown to impair productive 
work and lead to heavy loss of income and malnutrition in family members. 
When illness occurs the loss of income is borne by the household, and 
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healthier members have to work harder and longer to make up for the loss 
in income. With a healthy workforce employers can reduce the cost of 
downtime affecting their production schedules, invest more in staff training 
and exploit the benefi ts of specialisation.
The anticipated burgeoning of Small and Micro Enterprises (SMEs) 
may be hampered at the outset if access to infrastructural services 
such as water and electricity is not ensured. This is particularly the 
case for small enterprises (which tend to hire low-income workers) 
and for microenterprises (which are often a survival strategy for the 
low-income people themselves). Such infrastructure access often comes 
initially through home-based activities, so a full supply of services (not 
limited, for example, to a single yard tap or small-voltage electricity metre) 
to residences can also be seen as an investment in Local Economic 
Development. It has been estimated that one new small business can be 
created for every ten electricity connections, and that during the next 
ten years an additional R8 billion will be spent on appliances from 
electrifi cation (at existing rates of expansion), which in turn has spin-offs in 
the domestic appliance sector. 
But measuring the impact of infrastructure on SMEs is diffi cult. To take 
one example, it is notoriously diffi cult to quantify the multiplier effects 
of electrifi cation. Econometric studies of electrifi cation have generated 
(unrealistic) estimates of up to 1 000 000 new jobs created during the fi rst 
ten years of the programme, with an 11% cumulative increase in GDP. 
More accurate analysis based on recent experience with electrifi cation 
suggests that for every 100 households which are connected, between 10 
and 20 new economic activities are started. For example, electrical fridges 
are often acquired by small traders to store drinks and perishable goods; 
in one rural Kwazulu-Natal town, of 23 enterprises 21 required electrical 
refrigerators to store produce, meat and drinks for sale. The benefi ts of 
moving from very low electricity supplies (5-8 Amps) to an intermediate 
20 Amp supply are particularly large given the need to operate appliances 
such as refrigerators and small motors. For enterprises involved in welding 
or carpentry, higher levels of service are required. 
To achieve any of these local economic benefi ts of infrastructure 
investment requires very close attention to the ongoing subsidies that 
will permit the systems to operate. Indeed the primary reason that 
infrastructure investments do not pay off is that many people do not 
have enough income to afford the recurrent (operating and maintenance) 
charges associated with the service. Eskom’s rural electrifi cation 
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programme, for example, has had enormous problems paying for itself 
because consumption levels are so low due to lack of affordability. 
Clearly, an alternative approach is required based on the Constitutional 
responsibilities set out above, namely the provision of at least a basic 
minimal amount of water/sanitation (50 litres per person per day is the 
medium-target in the Reconstruction and Development Programme) and 
electricity (1 kiloWatt hour per capita per day) as a lifeline amount, 
with higher volume consumption (i.e., following the 50th liter of water) 
attracting much higher (and rising) tariffs.
In general, the best administrative system for this would be a free 
lifeline amount provided through metred taps and metred electricity 
hookups, with technical systems to reduce the amount to be consumed 
to the lifeline minimum in the event of non-payment on amounts higher 
than that minimum. The issue of consumption levels has implications for 
the wider benefi ts anticipated from infrastructure. For example, to realise 
the health benefi ts of infrastructure, the quantity of water is almost more 
important than water quality. For this reason, municipalities should strive 
to supply private household taps or at minimum yard taps when they 
make infrastructure investments, as distance to the water source is the 
most important factor affecting the quantity of water used by households. 
Improvements in both water and sanitation produce larger impacts than 
either alone. In addition, providing a lifeline source of water would make 
an enormous difference, given present low levels of per capita water 
consumption in low-income communities.
A cross-subsidised lifeline system must obviously be designed with a 
careful regulatory approach so as to avoid ruinous competition between 
individual service providers (municipalities or provinces competing for 
corporate investment or wealthy residents’ settlement by lowering the 
cross-subsidies). But making access to services subsidies universal, and 
assuring national standards, are not unusual features of pricing services, 
when broader social objectives are at stake. To illustrate, the South 
African government did not adopt a cost recovery approach to primary 
healthcare (it is free to all citizens) not only because health is a basic 
human right guaranteed in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights and because 
low-income people’s spending on healthcare is typically subtracted from 
spending on vital food and other components of good health, but also 
because it is administratively expensive to do so. It often costs more in 
cost recovery administration than can be squeezed out of low-income 
people desperate for treatment. 
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The optimal model for a Local Economic Development strategy would 
entail combinations of the strategies discussed above. For example, as 
an alternative to the proposed Coega port/IDZ, community activists and 
environmentalists have established a multifaceted approach that combines 
agriculture, mari-culture, eco-tourism and the massive expansion of 
infrastructure (Bond et al. 2001). Although given the balance of forces, 
it is doubtful whether Port Elizabeth elites will pursue this strategy – 
notwithstanding growing national concern at the way the Coega port/IDZ 
is proceeding – other case studies from Third World cities are promising.
CONCLUSION
Any alternative strategy will rely upon cutting-edge integrated development planning concepts. Town and rural planning traditionally took the form of physical planning (effi cient use of land, rehabilitation of slum areas, establishment of new 
towns, construction of industrial centres, development of satellite areas or 
reorganisation of transport needs), which ultimately expanded into land 
use zoning, public utility investment, housing and the like. A growing 
recognition of the importance of integrated planning subsequently emerged 
to link physical and socio-economic interests. This was particularly true in 
developing countries given rapid rural-urban migration. Some cities have 
had quite spectacular success with integrated planning, focusing on areas 
such as transport innovations and community self-reliance.
In the Brazilian city of Curitiba, for example, municipal government 
implemented a road infrastructure that includes special lanes for buses. The 
system is so effi cient, accessible and inexpensive that 75% of commuters 
utilise public transport. It is a self-suffi cient system whose risks are 
minimised by the government and whose investments gave the city the 
newest and most environmentally friendly bus-park in Brazil. Through 
active interventions in the land market, the municipality also managed 
to infl uence the location of commerce and low-income housing so as to 
minimise distance from bus routes, in the process creating a mix of low-, 
middle- and upper-class housing. The city centre is reserved for pedestrian 
use. Additional bike routes run through the whole of the city. The mix 
of activities ensures a balance of low- and high-income jobs, and thus 
stimulates social interaction (see Rabinovitch and Leitmann 1994). 
The case of Bogota, Colombia, raises the possibility of “cities within 
the city,” entailing a decentralised approach that emphasises self-reliance 
for communities. This reduces costs associated with commuting (including 
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personal time and fi nancial costs, the import of expensive fuels, congestion 
and air pollution). This strategy was credited with helping Bogota to sustain 
growth during periods when other centres did not fare well (see Currie 
1975; Gilbert 1996; Gilbert 1990; Riddler 1979).
There are, in sum, three broad conclusions that can be drawn from 
this review of cutting-edge debates in LED, especially in relation to South 
African policy and practice:
 • The “Washington Consensus” epoch of export-led growth and 
  ruinous competition may be drawing to a close, and with it, the 
  need to focus more on pro-poor and sustainable development 
  will mean that municipal constituents will demand a more active 
  and community-focused Local Economic Development strategy;
 • Numerous developmental tools have been established to 
  promote LED, along with redistributive strategies that are 
  genuinely pro-poor, but just as important are the various 
  nondevelopmental strategies that also have to be more widely 
  debated (such as IDZs and EPZs);
 • Introducing “public good” aspects of municipal services as an 
  explicit strategic orientation offers a way to assure that the 
  upgrade and cross-subsidisation of services such as water and 
  electricity can be justifi ed in part for the economic benefi t that 
  such services provide.
If true, a new “Post-Washington” era of LED may be on the immediate 
horizon in South Africa, which would allow for municipalities to fi nally 
embrace their own capacities, nurture and sustain a more genuinely 
developmental approach to their local economies, and reverse worsening 
patterns of uneven development that have followed from decades of 
pursuing non-developmental approaches.
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ENDNOTES
1. Special thanks to the International Labour Research and Information 
Group at the University of Cape Town, for contributing the information 
in this section.
2. Notwithstanding more than a decade’s worth of export-oriented policies, 
South Africa retains an international ranking of 43rd out of 49 major 
countries in the main Swiss business school’s 2001 competitiveness survey 
(Business Day, 25 April 2001).
3. According to the IDC study R13 644.3 million was identifi ed for 
investment in 7 projects at Coega, which were expected to create 1 
512 jobs (at R9.1 million per job). Potential investments for Coega listed 
in August 2000 were a R4.8 billion stainless steel plant by Ferrostaal 
(German); a R1.8 billion specialist steel factory by Danelli (Italian); and a 
R1.8 billion galvanised steel mill by Thyssen (German).
4. Ramatex – worth nearly R1 billion in investment, with a potential of 13 
000 new jobs – would have gone ahead because of the Africa Growth and 
Opportunities Act promulgated by the United States Government, rather 
than because of the SDI.
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